Simulation Expectation.
I present a new argument that we are much more likely to be living in a computer simulation than in the ground-level of reality. (Similar arguments can be marshalled for the view that we are more likely to be Boltzmann brains than ordinary people, but I focus on the case of simulations.) I explain h...
| Published in: | Erkenntnis Vol. 91; no. 1; pp. 427 - 445 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Springer Nature
Jan2026
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=190712038&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 190712038 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2026 vid: 91 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 190712038 10.1007/s10670-024-00901-9 ppf: 427 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 830KB tig: atl: Simulation Expectation. aug: au: Thomas, Teruji affil: https://ror.org/052gg0110 Global Priorities Institute, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK su: Simulation methods & models Worldview Refutation (Logic) Artificial intelligence Simulation software Epistemics sug: subj: Simulation methods & models Worldview Refutation (Logic) Artificial intelligence Simulation software Epistemics ab: I present a new argument that we are much more likely to be living in a computer simulation than in the ground-level of reality. (Similar arguments can be marshalled for the view that we are more likely to be Boltzmann brains than ordinary people, but I focus on the case of simulations.) I explain how this argument overcomes some objections to Bostrom's classic argument for the same conclusion. I also consider to what extent the argument depends upon an internalist conception of evidence, and I refute the common line of thought that finding many simulations being run—or running them ourselves—must increase the odds that we are in a simulation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2026. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|