Cover Image
QR Code

Identification and Inference in First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders and Selective Entry.

We study identification and inference in first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders and selective entry, building on a flexible framework we call the Affiliated Signal with Risk Aversion (AS-RA) model. Assuming exogenous variation in either the number of potential bidders (N) or a continuous inst...

Full description

Published in:Review of Economic Studies Vol. 93; no. 1; pp. 366 - 404
Main Authors: Chen, Xiaohong, Gentry, Matthew, Li, Tong, Lu, Jingfeng
Format: Article
Published: Oxford University Press / USA Jan2026
Subjects:
Inference (Logic)
Auctions
Bidders
Mathematical programming
Nonparametric estimation
Bidding strategies
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost