Specious present and its place in spacetime: towards a non-spatiotemporalist account for human consciousness.

In this article, I argue that our immediate present consciousness is not only phenomenally extended but also mereologically inverted in the sense that its phenomenal temporal parts depend for their existence on the whole, unlike any system or process in spacetime, in which the whole depends for its...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 207; no. 2; pp. 1 - 27
Autor principal: Zhou, Lyu
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Feb2026
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:In this article, I argue that our immediate present consciousness is not only phenomenally extended but also mereologically inverted in the sense that its phenomenal temporal parts depend for their existence on the whole, unlike any system or process in spacetime, in which the whole depends for its existence on the parts. The fact that our immediate present consciousness is mereologically inverted shows that it cannot exist in spacetime. Our immediate present consciousness cannot be a spatiotemporally extended process: any such process is not mereologically inverted, since it could have ceased halfway, with a part – i.e. the completed half – existing on its own without depending on the whole process for its existence. Nor can our immediate present consciousness be a point-event in spacetime: our immediate present consciousness is structurally complex and phenomenologically rich, but any point-event in spacetime is simple and structureless. I conclude that our immediate present consciousness cannot exist in spacetime. On my view, spacetime is a logical construct from the immediate phenomenal data of our consciousness.