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Commentary on Richard K. Atkins' Peirce on Inference.

Atkins boldly and resourcefully challenges the consensus that Peirce rejects Bayesianism. This commentary situates Atkins' approach within the broad problem of reconciling Peirce's theory of inquiry with his philosophy of probability. It finds much to appreciate in Atkins' approach, but it also rais...

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Publicado en:Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Vol. 61; no. 3; pp. 259 - 268
Autor principal: Kasser, Jeff
Formato: Editorial
Publicado: Indiana University Press Summer2025
Materias:
Bayesian analysis
Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914
Inference (Logic)
Belief & doubt
Dempster-Shafer theory
Modern philosophy
Inquiry (Theory of knowledge)
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Sumario:Atkins boldly and resourcefully challenges the consensus that Peirce rejects Bayesianism. This commentary situates Atkins' approach within the broad problem of reconciling Peirce's theory of inquiry with his philosophy of probability. It finds much to appreciate in Atkins' approach, but it also raises some textual worries about the proposal and offers an alternative conception of belief and degrees of belief.