Commentary on Richard K. Atkins' Peirce on Inference.

Atkins boldly and resourcefully challenges the consensus that Peirce rejects Bayesianism. This commentary situates Atkins' approach within the broad problem of reconciling Peirce's theory of inquiry with his philosophy of probability. It finds much to appreciate in Atkins' approach, but it also rais...

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Publicado en:Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Vol. 61; no. 3; pp. 259 - 268
Autor principal: Kasser, Jeff
Formato: Editorial
Publicado: Indiana University Press Summer2025
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Kasser, Jeff
        affil: Colorado State University
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        Bayesian analysis
        Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914
        Inference (Logic)
        Belief & doubt
        Dempster-Shafer theory
        Modern philosophy
        Inquiry (Theory of knowledge)
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          Bayesian analysis
          Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914
          Inference (Logic)
          Belief & doubt
          Dempster-Shafer theory
          Modern philosophy
          Inquiry (Theory of knowledge)
      keyword:
        Bayesianism
        Charles S. Peirce
        Frequentism
        Inquiry
        Probability
      ab: Atkins boldly and resourcefully challenges the consensus that Peirce rejects Bayesianism. This commentary situates Atkins' approach within the broad problem of reconciling Peirce's theory of inquiry with his philosophy of probability. It finds much to appreciate in Atkins' approach, but it also raises some textual worries about the proposal and offers an alternative conception of belief and degrees of belief.
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