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Public Listing Choice with Persistent Hidden Information.

How much does firm intangibility amplify CEOs' persistent private information and reduce firms' public listing propensity? We develop a model of competing public and private investors financing firms heterogeneously exposed to persistent private cash flows. Equilibrium financing is driven by informa...

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Publicado en:Review of Economic Studies Vol. 93; no. 2; pp. 833 - 892
Autores principales: Celentano, Francesco, Rempel, Mark
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Mar2026
Materias:
Information asymmetry
Disclosure
Intangible property
Executive compensation
Corporate finance
Going public (Securities)
Cash flow
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost