Public Listing Choice with Persistent Hidden Information.
How much does firm intangibility amplify CEOs' persistent private information and reduce firms' public listing propensity? We develop a model of competing public and private investors financing firms heterogeneously exposed to persistent private cash flows. Equilibrium financing is driven by informa...
| Published in: | Review of Economic Studies Vol. 93; no. 2; pp. 833 - 892 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Mar2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=192334040&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 192334040 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00346527 REM jtl: Review of Economic Studies issn: 00346527 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2026 vid: 93 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 192334040 10.1093/restud/rdaf039 ppf: 833 ppct: 59 formats: tig: atl: Public Listing Choice with Persistent Hidden Information. aug: au: Celentano, Francesco Rempel, Mark affil: University of Lausanne and Swiss Finance Institute, Switzerland University of Toronto, Canada su: Information asymmetry Disclosure Intangible property Executive compensation Corporate finance Going public (Securities) Cash flow sug: subj: Information asymmetry Disclosure Consumer Lending Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets (except Copyrighted Works) Intangible property Executive compensation Corporate finance Going public (Securities) Cash flow keyword: Assignment model CEO compensation copyrightHolder:Review of Economic Studies Ltd copyrightYear:2026 inLanguage:en Intangible capital Persistent private information Private equity premium Public listings publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf039 Structural estimation Assignment model CEO compensation copyrightHolder:Review of Economic Studies Ltd copyrightYear:2026 inLanguage:en Intangible capital Persistent private information Private equity premium Public listings publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf039 Structural estimation ab: How much does firm intangibility amplify CEOs' persistent private information and reduce firms' public listing propensity? We develop a model of competing public and private investors financing firms heterogeneously exposed to persistent private cash flows. Equilibrium financing is driven by information rent differentials in CEO compensation. We validate and structurally estimate the model using firm listing and CEO compensation data. We find private (intangible) cash flows exhibit 63% higher persistence than their tangible counterparts. Further, if firm intangibility levels returned to those of 1980, mean listing propensities would increase 5 percentage points while mean CEO variable pay growth would decrease by 61%. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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