| Sumario: | Extant work studying the relationship between populism and nuclear weapons policy predicts a populist affinity for nuclear weapons. However, this relationship may not be so straightforward in Europe, which relies in part on the nuclear umbrella of the United States for its deterrence. We present a theory which asserts that the anti-elitism and popular sovereignty dimensions of populism may manifest as anti-Americanism and an affinity for Putin's Russia, leading to decreased support for the nuclear sharing weapons among European populist publics. Leveraging nationally representative data in all five European nuclear sharing states, we show that populist citizens are indeed not more supportive of their countries' nuclear sharing arrangements than their less-populist counterparts and that they are less inclined to support nuclear weapons use against Russia. Relying on a population-based survey experiment, we provide evidence that the American ownership of these weapons suppresses populist citizens' support for the stationing and use of the nuclear sharing weapons. In addition, we find modest evidence that presenting Russia as the target of these weapons causes decreased support for nuclear weapons use among populists. Our theory has implications for the field's understanding of the deterrent value of these weapons, especially considering rising populism in Europe.
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