| Sumario: | Despite being indebted to Kant's aesthetics and what she saw as its hidden political philosophy, Hannah Arendt was quite critical of his ethics. When her objections to Kant's moral philosophy are discussed, the focus is usually on her claim that it is centred on the self and lacks concern for others and the world. But Arendt also claims that Kant does not think there is room for judgement in the moral sphere – and appears to share this view herself. In this paper, I focus on this aspect of her critique, which has been neglected by commentators. Given Arendt's turn to Kant's third Critique and her insights into its conception of judgement, I argue that she ought not to have excluded judgement from the realm of morality. Further evidence for this is suggested by her remarks on the trial of Eichmann, where she seems to want to allow a place for judgement in moral reasoning. I conclude by showing that not only did Arendt wrestle with the question of the relationship between morality and judgement, but that her innovative reading of Kant's theory of reflective judgement should have led her to afford it a prominent role in the practical domain.
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