Towards a "halfway plausible theory of ethics": judgement in Arendt's critique of Kant's moral philosophy.
Despite being indebted to Kant's aesthetics and what she saw as its hidden political philosophy, Hannah Arendt was quite critical of his ethics. When her objections to Kant's moral philosophy are discussed, the focus is usually on her claim that it is centred on the self and lacks concern for others...
| Publicado en: | British Journal for the History of Philosophy Vol. 34; no. 2; pp. 337 - 358 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2026
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=192584343&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 192584343 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09608788 5AX jtl: British Journal for the History of Philosophy issn: 09608788 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2026 vid: 34 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 192584343 10.1080/09608788.2025.2527980 ppf: 337 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 334KB tig: atl: Towards a "halfway plausible theory of ethics": judgement in Arendt's critique of Kant's moral philosophy. aug: au: Dunn, Nicholas affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada su: Plausibility (Logic) Arendt, Hannah, 1906-1975 Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Ethics Political philosophy sug: subj: Plausibility (Logic) Arendt, Hannah, 1906-1975 Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Ethics Political philosophy keyword: Arendt ethics judgement Kant reflection ab: Despite being indebted to Kant's aesthetics and what she saw as its hidden political philosophy, Hannah Arendt was quite critical of his ethics. When her objections to Kant's moral philosophy are discussed, the focus is usually on her claim that it is centred on the self and lacks concern for others and the world. But Arendt also claims that Kant does not think there is room for judgement in the moral sphere – and appears to share this view herself. In this paper, I focus on this aspect of her critique, which has been neglected by commentators. Given Arendt's turn to Kant's third Critique and her insights into its conception of judgement, I argue that she ought not to have excluded judgement from the realm of morality. Further evidence for this is suggested by her remarks on the trial of Eichmann, where she seems to want to allow a place for judgement in moral reasoning. I conclude by showing that not only did Arendt wrestle with the question of the relationship between morality and judgement, but that her innovative reading of Kant's theory of reflective judgement should have led her to afford it a prominent role in the practical domain. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of British Journal for the History of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: British Journal for the History of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|