Spacetime and perception: a special relativistic defense of naïve realism.

In this paper, I advance a special-relativistic formulation of naïve realism and use it to respond to the time-lag objection, the claim that naïve realism cannot account for the perception of distant objects that ceased to exist. On the view proposed, an object constitutes a perceptual episode when...

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Publicado en:	Synthese Vol. 207; no. 5; pp. 1 - 19
Autor principal:	da Silva, Gesiel Borges
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Springer Nature May2026
Materias:	Special relativity (Physics) Light cones Visual perception Realism Time Perception (Philosophy)
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost