| Sumario: | The article focuses on the philosophical interpretations and developments of pragmatism, particularly William James’s conception of truth as a practical, evolving artifact rather than a fixed correspondence to reality. It examines Cheryl Misak’s historical analysis in *Cambridge Pragmatism*, which traces the influence of American pragmatists like James and Charles Sanders Peirce on early analytic philosophy in Cambridge, England, highlighting figures such as Frank P. Ramsey who integrated pragmatic ideas with formal logic and probability theory. The article clarifies misunderstandings about James’s view of truth, emphasizing that for James and Peirce, truth consists in beliefs that tend to satisfy inquirers over time, functioning as habits or tools rather than static relations to an independent reality. It also contrasts James’s more individual-centered, mutable notion of truth with Ramsey’s more normatively objective pragmatism, while arguing that Peirce’s original pragmatism accommodates degrees of belief and rational inquiry compatible with Bayesian updating. Ultimately, the article situates pragmatism as a naturalistic, psychologically grounded approach to truth and inquiry that challenges traditional metaphysical and correspondence theories.
|
|---|