JAMES, PRAGMATISM, AND THE TWO CAMBRIDGES.
The article focuses on the philosophical interpretations and developments of pragmatism, particularly William James’s conception of truth as a practical, evolving artifact rather than a fixed correspondence to reality. It examines Cheryl Misak’s historical analysis in *Cambridge Pragmatism*, which t...
| Publicado en: | William James Studies Vol. 20; no. 2; pp. 1 - 27 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
William James Society
Spring2026
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=193194599&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 193194599 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 19338295 78J3 jtl: William James Studies issn: 19338295 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Spring2026 vid: 20 iid: 2 pid: 58346 pub: William James Society artinfo: ui: 193194599 ppf: 1 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 3MB tig: atl: JAMES, PRAGMATISM, AND THE TWO CAMBRIDGES. aug: au: CORMIER, HARVEY affil: Stony Brook University su: James, William, 1842-1910 Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 James (Book : Everett) Philosophers Pragmatism Bayesian analysis Belief & doubt Cambridge (England) sug: subj: Cambridge (England) James, William, 1842-1910 Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 James (Book : Everett) Philosophers Pragmatism Bayesian analysis Belief & doubt ab: The article focuses on the philosophical interpretations and developments of pragmatism, particularly William James’s conception of truth as a practical, evolving artifact rather than a fixed correspondence to reality. It examines Cheryl Misak’s historical analysis in *Cambridge Pragmatism*, which traces the influence of American pragmatists like James and Charles Sanders Peirce on early analytic philosophy in Cambridge, England, highlighting figures such as Frank P. Ramsey who integrated pragmatic ideas with formal logic and probability theory. The article clarifies misunderstandings about James’s view of truth, emphasizing that for James and Peirce, truth consists in beliefs that tend to satisfy inquirers over time, functioning as habits or tools rather than static relations to an independent reality. It also contrasts James’s more individual-centered, mutable notion of truth with Ramsey’s more normatively objective pragmatism, while arguing that Peirce’s original pragmatism accommodates degrees of belief and rational inquiry compatible with Bayesian updating. Ultimately, the article situates pragmatism as a naturalistic, psychologically grounded approach to truth and inquiry that challenges traditional metaphysical and correspondence theories. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of William James Studies is the property of William James Society and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: William James Studies holder: William James Society dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|