Partisan bias and performance improvement efforts in program administration: evidence from unemployment insurance programs in the American states.
One critical way that public agencies can improve administrative performance is through its discretionary efforts at detecting program errors. This requires an alignment between political and administrative objectives within executive branch governance. Specifically, we hypothesize that agency effor...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory Vol. 36; no. 2; pp. 267 - 281 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=193631233&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 193631233 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 10531858 172N jtl: Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory issn: 10531858 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2026 vid: 36 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 193631233 10.1093/jopart/muag005 ppf: 267 ppct: 14 formats: tig: atl: Partisan bias and performance improvement efforts in program administration: evidence from unemployment insurance programs in the American states. aug: au: Krause, George A Hong, Ji Hyeun affil: Department of Public Administration and Policy, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602, United States su: Partisanship Government agencies Public administration Power (Social sciences) Unemployment insurance Overpayment Organizational performance sug: subj: Partisanship Government agencies Public administration Power (Social sciences) Other provincial and territorial public administration Other local, municipal and regional public administration Other General Government Support Other federal government public administration Unemployment insurance Overpayment Organizational performance keyword: copyrightHolder:Public Management Research Association copyrightYear:2026 inLanguage:en partisan bias performance improvement program administration publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muag005 unemployment insurance copyrightHolder:Public Management Research Association copyrightYear:2026 inLanguage:en partisan bias performance improvement program administration publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muag005 unemployment insurance ab: One critical way that public agencies can improve administrative performance is through its discretionary efforts at detecting program errors. This requires an alignment between political and administrative objectives within executive branch governance. Specifically, we hypothesize that agency efforts for detecting benefit overpayment errors from state unemployment insurance (UI) programs will be higher under Republican partisan gubernatorial control of state UI agency heads compared to Democratic counterparts. Based on panel data consisting of 999 observations covering fifty state UI agencies between 2002 and 2021, our lognormal maximum likelihood estimates reveal a partisan differential between Republican and Democratic governors with direct appointment control over UIP agency heads are associated with a within-state average of $ 2.647 million higher correction of benefit overpayments to unemployed claimants (i.e. a per claimant overpayment case partisan differential of $ 618.68). State UIP agencies investments in performance improvement that identify program waste reflect the importance of partisan incentives, coupled with unity in executive branch governance. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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