ACCOUNTABILITY WITHOUT EQUALITY IN SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH THINKING ANIMALS.
This essay makes a case that the ethical phenomena of accountability and recognition are not, as is widely believed, grounded in the psychological capacity of self-conscious reflective thought characteristic of persons. We know this because we have relationships of accountability and recognition wit...
| Publicado en: | Crítica Vol. 58; no. 172; pp. 249 - 276 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas
abr2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | This essay makes a case that the ethical phenomena of accountability and recognition are not, as is widely believed, grounded in the psychological capacity of self-conscious reflective thought characteristic of persons. We know this because we have relationships of accountability and recognition with some animals who are clearly not self-conscious in that sense. On the other hand, not all conscious animals are capable of accountability or recognition. Thus we must focus on a capacity intermediate between mere conscious awareness and self-consciousness in order to explain accountability and recognition. Este ensayo arguye que los fenómenos éticos de responsabilidad y reconocimiento no se basan (como suele creerse) en la capacidad psicológica de pensamiento reflexivo autoconsciente característica de personas. Sabemos esto porque tenemos relaciones de responsabilidad y reconocimiento con animales que claramente no poseen autoconciencia en tal sentido. Por otro lado, no todos los animales conscientes son capaces de ejercer responsabilidad o reconocimiento. Así, pues, debemos enfocarnos en una capacidad intermedia entre la mera conciencia y la autoconciencia para explicar la responsabilidad y el reconocimiento. |
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