ACCOUNTABILITY WITHOUT EQUALITY IN SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH THINKING ANIMALS.
This essay makes a case that the ethical phenomena of accountability and recognition are not, as is widely believed, grounded in the psychological capacity of self-conscious reflective thought characteristic of persons. We know this because we have relationships of accountability and recognition wit...
| Publicado en: | Crítica Vol. 58; no. 172; pp. 249 - 276 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas
abr2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=193869396&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 193869396 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00111503 H9Y jtl: Crítica issn: 00111503 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: abr2026 vid: 58 iid: 172 pid: 10429 pub: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas artinfo: ui: 193869396 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2026.1789 ppf: 249 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 768KB tig: atl: ACCOUNTABILITY WITHOUT EQUALITY IN SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH THINKING ANIMALS. aug: au: GARTHOFF, JON affil: University of Tennessee, USA su: Ethics Self-consciousness (Awareness) Responsibility Cognition Awareness Consciousness Animal intelligence Interpersonal relations sug: subj: Ethics Self-consciousness (Awareness) Responsibility Cognition Awareness Consciousness Animal intelligence Interpersonal relations keyword: cooperation recognition reflection responsibility thought cooperación pensamiento reconocimiento reflexión responsabilidad ab: This essay makes a case that the ethical phenomena of accountability and recognition are not, as is widely believed, grounded in the psychological capacity of self-conscious reflective thought characteristic of persons. We know this because we have relationships of accountability and recognition with some animals who are clearly not self-conscious in that sense. On the other hand, not all conscious animals are capable of accountability or recognition. Thus we must focus on a capacity intermediate between mere conscious awareness and self-consciousness in order to explain accountability and recognition. Este ensayo arguye que los fenómenos éticos de responsabilidad y reconocimiento no se basan (como suele creerse) en la capacidad psicológica de pensamiento reflexivo autoconsciente característica de personas. Sabemos esto porque tenemos relaciones de responsabilidad y reconocimiento con animales que claramente no poseen autoconciencia en tal sentido. Por otro lado, no todos los animales conscientes son capaces de ejercer responsabilidad o reconocimiento. Así, pues, debemos enfocarnos en una capacidad intermedia entre la mera conciencia y la autoconciencia para explicar la responsabilidad y el reconocimiento. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Crítica is the property of Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Crítica holder: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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