| Sumario: | This article traces the evolution of Russia's policy in the Middle East since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It argues that, though the region has become more important for Russia economically and politically, the Kremlin's ability to project military power into the Middle East has eroded. The article characterizes Russia's evolving, post-invasion policy as generally risk-averse, yet marked by a calibrated anti-Western and anti-Israeli tilt that has ebbed and flowed over time. Addressing the importance of Hamas's attack on Israel in October 2023, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, and the "Twelve-Day War" in June 2025 as inflection points, it concludes that Russia's regional position has weakened relative to the peak of Russian power projection a decade ago. Still, regional states continue to see utility in engaging with Russia for various economic, political, and security reasons. Receptiveness to Russia has also been sustained by perceptions of the origins and nature of the Ukraine war, as well as of Western hypocrisy and unreliability, including in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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