| Sumario: | European strategic discussions remain constrained by nuclear-centric thinking, especially the notion that deterrence requires credible nuclear escalation options. In scenarios short of a full-scale nuclear exchange, nuclear threats are problematic: they are often inherently incredible, too costly or too dangerous. Continuing to rely on nuclear-centric strategies entails political, operational and strategic risks. It also narrows the conceptual space for imagining how Europe's future deterrence architecture, with or without the United States, might look. We propose a substitution deterrence model for Europe, centred on conventional denial combined with potential conventional escalation through advanced long-range conventional precision-strike capabilities. Existing national nuclear arsenals, maintained in a minimum deterrence posture to provide secure second-strike capabilities, would be a residual hedge against worst-case scenarios, including a pre-emptive strike or large-scale nuclear coercion. Substituting advanced conventional weapons for tactical and/or theatre nuclear weapons would offer deterrence benefits, enable more equitable burden-sharing between nuclear and non-nuclear NATO members, and reduce incentives for nuclear proliferation. Doing so also offers a more politically, operationally and strategically sustainable alternative to the nuclear-centric deterrence model that continues to dominate European and NATO strategic thinking.
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