A hole in the nuclear umbrella? Rethinking European deterrence and escalation management through conventional counterforce.
European strategic discussions remain constrained by nuclear-centric thinking, especially the notion that deterrence requires credible nuclear escalation options. In scenarios short of a full-scale nuclear exchange, nuclear threats are problematic: they are often inherently incredible, too costly or...
| Publicado en: | International Affairs Vol. 102; no. 4; pp. 1267 - 1287 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=195222516&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 195222516 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00205850 INA jtl: International Affairs issn: 00205850 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2026 vid: 102 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 195222516 10.1093/ia/iiag091 ppf: 1267 ppct: 20 formats: tig: atl: A hole in the nuclear umbrella? Rethinking European deterrence and escalation management through conventional counterforce. aug: au: Desmaele, Linde Cooper, Austin R affil: Leiden University Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, Turfmarkt 99, 2501 EE The Hague, Netherlands Purdue University, 610 Purdue Mall, West Lafayette, IN 47907, United States su: Europe North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear weapons Nuclear nonproliferation International security Deterrence (Military strategy) Military strategy sug: subj: Nuclear weapons Nuclear nonproliferation International security Europe North Atlantic Treaty Organization Deterrence (Military strategy) Military strategy keyword: copyrightHolder:The Royal Institute of International Affairs copyrightYear:2026 European security inLanguage:en international security NATO nuclear publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiag091 transatlantic relations copyrightHolder:The Royal Institute of International Affairs copyrightYear:2026 European security inLanguage:en international security NATO nuclear publisher:Oxford University Press sameAs:https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiag091 transatlantic relations ab: European strategic discussions remain constrained by nuclear-centric thinking, especially the notion that deterrence requires credible nuclear escalation options. In scenarios short of a full-scale nuclear exchange, nuclear threats are problematic: they are often inherently incredible, too costly or too dangerous. Continuing to rely on nuclear-centric strategies entails political, operational and strategic risks. It also narrows the conceptual space for imagining how Europe's future deterrence architecture, with or without the United States, might look. We propose a substitution deterrence model for Europe, centred on conventional denial combined with potential conventional escalation through advanced long-range conventional precision-strike capabilities. Existing national nuclear arsenals, maintained in a minimum deterrence posture to provide secure second-strike capabilities, would be a residual hedge against worst-case scenarios, including a pre-emptive strike or large-scale nuclear coercion. Substituting advanced conventional weapons for tactical and/or theatre nuclear weapons would offer deterrence benefits, enable more equitable burden-sharing between nuclear and non-nuclear NATO members, and reduce incentives for nuclear proliferation. Doing so also offers a more politically, operationally and strategically sustainable alternative to the nuclear-centric deterrence model that continues to dominate European and NATO strategic thinking. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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