| Sumario: | This paper argues an ontological misunderstanding concerning artificial intelligence and posits communication as a mark of human identity. This is grounded in certain problematic claims throughout history that have contributed to the current understanding of AI. The confusion comes from the two-fold understanding of 'intelligence--the first from the problematic accretion of Turing's conception of AI as an observation of behavior, while the second from the operational understanding of 'intelligence.' This paper traces the origin of this misconception to the Cartesian dichotomy of body and cogito, as articulated in Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind. We argue that the Cartesian error is similar to Turing's claim that deception is the ground for the perception of thinking. This paper then proceeds to consider Elena Esposito's idea of AI as artificial communication, further presenting the misunderstanding of intelligence in AI. The paper then ends with the claim that an obvious difference between AI and humans is intentionality.
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