Freedom and Commitment: Does Kant Hold a Subjectivist Theory of Freedom?
According to a Subjectivist theory of X, reference to belief in the existence of X enters essentially into a full account of what the existence of X consists in. A Subjectivist theory doesn’t claim that X is a ‘merely subjective’ phenomenon; it’s a theory of what the existence of X consists in as a...
| Publicado en: | Filozofia Vol. 81; no. 3; pp. 277 - 294 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Filozofia
2026
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | According to a Subjectivist theory of X, reference to belief in the existence of X enters essentially into a full account of what the existence of X consists in. A Subjectivist theory doesn’t claim that X is a ‘merely subjective’ phenomenon; it’s a theory of what the existence of X consists in as a matter of objective fact. A Commitment theory of X is a theory of X that holds that we are inescapably committed to believing in the existence of X. It may also be a Subjectivist theory of X and hold that our commitment to belief in the existence of X is part of what makes it the case that X exists. This paper aims to specify the character of Subjectivist and Commitment theories, before suggesting that Kant may be said to have held a Subjectivist and indeed Commitment theory of freedom. |
|---|