Freedom and Commitment: Does Kant Hold a Subjectivist Theory of Freedom?

According to a Subjectivist theory of X, reference to belief in the existence of X enters essentially into a full account of what the existence of X consists in. A Subjectivist theory doesn’t claim that X is a ‘merely subjective’ phenomenon; it’s a theory of what the existence of X consists in as a...

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Publicado en:Filozofia Vol. 81; no. 3; pp. 277 - 294
Autor principal: STRAWSON, GALEN
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Filozofia 2026
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Freedom and Commitment: Does Kant Hold a Subjectivist Theory of Freedom?
      aug:
        au: STRAWSON, GALEN
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, USA.
      su:
        Kantian ethics
        Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804
        Facts (Philosophy)
        Subjectivity
        Liberty
        Theory (Philosophy)
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        subj:
          Kantian ethics
          Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804
          Facts (Philosophy)
          Subjectivity
          Liberty
          Theory (Philosophy)
      keyword:
        cognitive phenomenology
        commitment theory of freedom
        free will
        Kant
        moral law
        self-creation
      ab: According to a Subjectivist theory of X, reference to belief in the existence of X enters essentially into a full account of what the existence of X consists in. A Subjectivist theory doesn’t claim that X is a ‘merely subjective’ phenomenon; it’s a theory of what the existence of X consists in as a matter of objective fact. A Commitment theory of X is a theory of X that holds that we are inescapably committed to believing in the existence of X. It may also be a Subjectivist theory of X and hold that our commitment to belief in the existence of X is part of what makes it the case that X exists. This paper aims to specify the character of Subjectivist and Commitment theories, before suggesting that Kant may be said to have held a Subjectivist and indeed Commitment theory of freedom.
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