Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation.

We study the problem of designing a dynamic reassignment mechanism when agents' preferences over objects change over time. In the context of Norway's system for (re)assigning patients to general practitioners (GPs), we provide direct evidence of misallocation under the current mechanism—patients wai...

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Publicado en:	American Economic Review Vol. 116; no. 8; pp. 3036 - 3076
Autores principales:	Huitfeldt, Ingrid, Marone, Victoria, Waldinger, Daniel
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	American Economic Association Aug2026
Materias:	Norway Patient safety Resource allocation General practitioners Medical care wait times Market failure Structural frame models Matching theory
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost