Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation.
We study the problem of designing a dynamic reassignment mechanism when agents' preferences over objects change over time. In the context of Norway's system for (re)assigning patients to general practitioners (GPs), we provide direct evidence of misallocation under the current mechanism—patients wai...
| Publicado en: | American Economic Review Vol. 116; no. 8; pp. 3036 - 3076 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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American Economic Association
Aug2026
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=195841025&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 195841025 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00028282 AER jtl: American Economic Review issn: 00028282 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2026 vid: 116 iid: 8 pid: 22 pub: American Economic Association artinfo: ui: 195841025 10.1257/aer.20240617 ppf: 3036 ppct: 40 formats: tig: atl: Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation. aug: au: Huitfeldt, Ingrid Marone, Victoria Waldinger, Daniel affil: Department of Economics, BI Norwegian Business School Department of Economics, Yale University Department of Economics, New York University su: Norway Patient safety Resource allocation General practitioners Medical care wait times Market failure Structural frame models Matching theory sug: subj: Patient safety Resource allocation Norway General practitioners Medical care wait times Market failure Structural frame models Matching theory ab: We study the problem of designing a dynamic reassignment mechanism when agents' preferences over objects change over time. In the context of Norway's system for (re)assigning patients to general practitioners (GPs), we provide direct evidence of misallocation under the current mechanism—patients waiting for each others' GPs, but who cannot trade—and estimate a structural model of GP-switching behavior to evaluate alternatives. Introducing top trading cycles (TTC) would, on average, reduce waiting times and increase patient welfare. However, patients endowed with less desirable GPs would be harmed. Prioritizing these patients can avoid these harms while preserving most of the gains from TTC. (JEL D82, H51, I11, I13, I18) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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