A model of China's agricultural crisis and famine in 1959–1961.

The Chinese collectivization movement culminated in a famine from 1959–1961 that resulted in up to 30 million deaths. Lin argues that the famine was due to making collective membership mandatory. This turned a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma into a one-shot game with shirk as the dominant action. This p...

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Publicado en:	Oxford Economic Papers Vol. 78; no. 3; pp. 799 - 824
Autor principal:	McGinty, Matthew
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Oxford University Press / USA Jul2026
Materias:	China Famines Game theory Cooperative agriculture Coordination games (Mathematics) Incentive (Psychology) Agrarian distress Returns to scale
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost