A Multilevel, Interdisciplinary Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness.
The article argues against the assertion by David Chalmers that phenomenal properties are noncausal or epiphenomenal and create an alternative casual view of phenomenal consciousness that requires an interdisciplinary approach. Chalmers has stated that the cognitive sciences are able to give causal...
| Publicado en: | Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 43; no. 4; pp. 531 - 544 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Winter2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The article argues against the assertion by David Chalmers that phenomenal properties are noncausal or epiphenomenal and create an alternative casual view of phenomenal consciousness that requires an interdisciplinary approach. Chalmers has stated that the cognitive sciences are able to give causal explanations of the cognitive functions of consciousness in terms of computational and neural mechanisms. |
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