A Multilevel, Interdisciplinary Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness.
The article argues against the assertion by David Chalmers that phenomenal properties are noncausal or epiphenomenal and create an alternative casual view of phenomenal consciousness that requires an interdisciplinary approach. Chalmers has stated that the cognitive sciences are able to give causal...
| Publicado en: | Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 43; no. 4; pp. 531 - 544 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Winter2005
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=19792867&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 19792867 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384283 2GW jtl: Southern Journal of Philosophy issn: 00384283 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Winter2005 vid: 43 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 19792867 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2005.tb01967.x ppf: 531 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 481KB tig: atl: A Multilevel, Interdisciplinary Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness. aug: au: Burton, Robert G. affil: University of Georgia su: Phenomenalism Causation (Philosophy) Consciousness Chalmers, David Phenomenology Cognitive science Philosophy & cognitive science sug: subj: Phenomenalism Causation (Philosophy) Consciousness Chalmers, David Phenomenology Cognitive science Philosophy & cognitive science ab: The article argues against the assertion by David Chalmers that phenomenal properties are noncausal or epiphenomenal and create an alternative casual view of phenomenal consciousness that requires an interdisciplinary approach. Chalmers has stated that the cognitive sciences are able to give causal explanations of the cognitive functions of consciousness in terms of computational and neural mechanisms. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Southern Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Southern Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2005 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|