| Sumario: | Despite the widespread use of key concepts of the Neyman-Pearson (N-P) statistical paradigm-type I and II errors, significance levels, power, confidence levels-they have been the subject of philosophical controversy and debate for over 60 years. Both current and long-standing problems of N-P tests stem from unclarity and confusion, even among N-P adherents, as to how a test's (pre-data) error probabilities are to be used for (post-data) inductive inference as opposed to inductive behavior. We argue that the relevance of error probabilities is to ensure that only statistical hypotheses that have passed severe or probative tests are inferred from the data. The severity criterion supplies a meta-statistical principle for evaluating proposed statistical inferences, avoiding classic fallacies from tests that are overly sensitive, as well as those not sensitive enough to particular errors and discrepancies.
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