Overextending Partial Structures: Idealization and Abstraction.
The partial structures program of da Costa, French and others offers a unified framework within which to handle a wide range of issues central to contemporary philosophy of science. I argue that the program is inadequately equipped to account for simple cases where idealizations are used to construc...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 72; no. 5; pp. 1248 - 1260 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=24277115&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 24277115 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2005 vid: 72 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 24277115 10.1086/508123 ppf: 1248 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 127KB tig: atl: Overextending Partial Structures: Idealization and Abstraction. aug: au: Pincock, Christopher affil: Department of Philosophy, Beering Hall, Purdue University, 100 N. University Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2098 su: Philosophy & science Mathematical models Philosophy of science Mathematics Abstract thought Logic sug: subj: Philosophy & science Mathematical models Philosophy of science Mathematics Abstract thought Logic ab: The partial structures program of da Costa, French and others offers a unified framework within which to handle a wide range of issues central to contemporary philosophy of science. I argue that the program is inadequately equipped to account for simple cases where idealizations are used to construct abstract, mathematical models of physical systems. These problems show that da Costa and French have not overcome the objections raised by Cartwright and Suárez using model-theoretic techniques in the philosophy of science. However, my concerns arise independently of the more controversial assumptions that Cartwright and Suárez have employed. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2005 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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