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Approximate Truth and Descriptive Nesting.

Abstract  There is good reason to suppose that our best physical theories, quantum mechanics and special relativity, are false if taken together and literally. If they are in fact false, then how should they count as providing knowledge of the physical world? One might imagine that, while strictly...

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Published in:Erkenntnis Vol. 68; no. 2; pp. 213 - 225
Main Author: Jeffrey Barrett
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Mar2008
Subjects:
Quantum theory
Relativity
Truth
Empirical research
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        au: Jeffrey Barrett
        affil: University of California at Irvine Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, School of Social Sciences Irvine CA 92697-4555 USA
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        Quantum theory
        Relativity
        Truth
        Empirical research
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          Quantum theory
          Relativity
          Truth
          Empirical research
      ab: Abstract  There is good reason to suppose that our best physical theories, quantum mechanics and special relativity, are false if taken together and literally. If they are in fact false, then how should they count as providing knowledge of the physical world? One might imagine that, while strictly false, our best physical theories are nevertheless in some sense probably approximately true. This paper presents a notion of local probable approximate truth in terms of descriptive nesting relations between current and subsequent theories. This notion helps explain how false physical theories might nevertheless provide physical knowledge of a variety that is particularly salient to diachronic empirical inquiry.
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    language: English
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