SUBJECT SENSITIVE INVARIANTISM: IN MEMORIAM.
Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that whether a subject knows depends on what is at stake for that subject: the truth-value of a knowledge-attribution is sensitive to the subject's practical interests. I argue that subject sensitive invariantism cannot accept a very plausible principle for...
| Published in: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 58; no. 231; pp. 318 - 326 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2008
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that whether a subject knows depends on what is at stake for that subject: the truth-value of a knowledge-attribution is sensitive to the subject's practical interests. I argue that subject sensitive invariantism cannot accept a very plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I argue, furthermore, that semantic contextualism and contrastivism can accept this plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I conclude that semantic contextualism and contrastivism are in a dialectical position better than subject sensitive invariantism is. |
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