IMMATERIAL BEINGS.
The article presents a conceptualization of holes that falls in between the two extremes of inflationary and deflationary accounts and rejects that initial perspective of holes in terms of absences. Accordingly, it contends that there are no special metaphysical problems associated with holes and re...
| Publicado en: | Monist Vol. 90; no. 3; pp. 349 - 372 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2007
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The article presents a conceptualization of holes that falls in between the two extremes of inflationary and deflationary accounts and rejects that initial perspective of holes in terms of absences. Accordingly, it contends that there are no special metaphysical problems associated with holes and resists the notion that there are any immaterial beings. Moreover, it discusses some reasons why individuals should not be suspicious of the idea that there exist entities just where they think there exist holes. |
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