IMMATERIAL BEINGS.

The article presents a conceptualization of holes that falls in between the two extremes of inflationary and deflationary accounts and rejects that initial perspective of holes in terms of absences. Accordingly, it contends that there are no special metaphysical problems associated with holes and re...

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Publicado en:Monist Vol. 90; no. 3; pp. 349 - 372
Autor principal: Miller, Kristie
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Jul2007
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: IMMATERIAL BEINGS.
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        affil: The University of Sydney
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        Metaphysics
        Philosophy of mind
        Critical thinking
        Ends & means
        Cognitive science
        Philosophical anthropology
        Reflective learning
        Immaterialism (Philosophy)
        Idea (Philosophy)
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          Metaphysics
          Philosophy of mind
          Critical thinking
          Ends & means
          Cognitive science
          Philosophical anthropology
          Reflective learning
          Immaterialism (Philosophy)
          Idea (Philosophy)
      ab: The article presents a conceptualization of holes that falls in between the two extremes of inflationary and deflationary accounts and rejects that initial perspective of holes in terms of absences. Accordingly, it contends that there are no special metaphysical problems associated with holes and resists the notion that there are any immaterial beings. Moreover, it discusses some reasons why individuals should not be suspicious of the idea that there exist entities just where they think there exist holes.
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