Making Models Count.
What sort of claims do scientific models make and how do these claims then underwrite empirical successes such as explanations and reliable policy interventions? In this paper I propose answers to these questions for the class of models used throughout the social and biological sciences, namely idea...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 75; no. 3; pp. 383 - 405 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jul2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | What sort of claims do scientific models make and how do these claims then underwrite empirical successes such as explanations and reliable policy interventions? In this paper I propose answers to these questions for the class of models used throughout the social and biological sciences, namely idealized deductive ones with a causal interpretation. I argue that the two main existing accounts misrepresent how these models are actually used, and propose a new account. |
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