Making Models Count.

What sort of claims do scientific models make and how do these claims then underwrite empirical successes such as explanations and reliable policy interventions? In this paper I propose answers to these questions for the class of models used throughout the social and biological sciences, namely idea...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 75; no. 3; pp. 383 - 405
Autor principal: Alexandrova, Anna
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Jul2008
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Alexandrova, Anna
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall (MC 73), One University Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63121-4400
      su:
        Simulation methods & models
        Social science simulation methods
        Life sciences
        Causation (Philosophy)
        Game theory
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          Simulation methods & models
          Social science simulation methods
          Life sciences
          Causation (Philosophy)
          Game theory
      ab: What sort of claims do scientific models make and how do these claims then underwrite empirical successes such as explanations and reliable policy interventions? In this paper I propose answers to these questions for the class of models used throughout the social and biological sciences, namely idealized deductive ones with a causal interpretation. I argue that the two main existing accounts misrepresent how these models are actually used, and propose a new account.
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