Ryle on Knowing How and the Possibility of Vocational Education.

Ryle's claim that knowing how is distinct from knowing that is defended from critics like Stanley and Williamson and Snowdon. However, the way in which Ryle himself deploys this distinction is problematic. By effectively dismissing the idea that systematic propositional knowledge has a significant b...

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Publicado en:Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 26; no. 1; pp. 88 - 102
Autor principal: WINCH, CHRISTOPHER
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Feb2009
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: WINCH, CHRISTOPHER
        affil: Department of Education and Professional Studies, King's College, London, SE1, 9NH, UK
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        Vocational education
        Ryle, Gilbert, 1900-1976
        Education
        Philosophy
        Theory of knowledge
        Metaphysics
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          Vocational education
          Ryle, Gilbert, 1900-1976
          Education
          Philosophy
          Theory of knowledge
          Metaphysics
      ab: Ryle's claim that knowing how is distinct from knowing that is defended from critics like Stanley and Williamson and Snowdon. However, the way in which Ryle himself deploys this distinction is problematic. By effectively dismissing the idea that systematic propositional knowledge has a significant bearing on knowledge how, Ryle implicitly supports a view of vocational education that favours narrow notions of skill and associated training over knowledge informed occupational practice of the kind found in most Northern European countries. The source of Ryle's error in excluding systematic propositional knowledge from a significant place in the constitution of knowing how is traced. It is argued that Ryle's original distinction survives without the exclusion of systematic propositional knowledge from knowing how and the resulting account does more justice to the practice of vocational education in advanced economies than does Ryle's original treatment.
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