WHEN IS PARSIMONY A VIRTUE?
Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on b...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 59; no. 235; pp. 216 - 237 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2009
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on behalf of physicalism and on behalf of nominalism. None of the accounts of the virtue of parsimony extends naturally to either of these philosophical cases. This suggests that in typical philosophical contexts, ontological simplicity has no evidential value. |
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