WHEN IS PARSIMONY A VIRTUE?
Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on b...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 59; no. 235; pp. 216 - 237 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2009
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=36606275&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 36606275 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2009 vid: 59 iid: 235 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 36606275 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.569.x ppf: 216 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 123KB tig: atl: WHEN IS PARSIMONY A VIRTUE? aug: au: Huemer, Michael su: Parsimonious models Virtue Empiricism Nominalism Virtue epistemology sug: subj: Parsimonious models Virtue Empiricism Nominalism Virtue epistemology ab: Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on behalf of physicalism and on behalf of nominalism. None of the accounts of the virtue of parsimony extends naturally to either of these philosophical cases. This suggests that in typical philosophical contexts, ontological simplicity has no evidential value. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2009 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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