ON (NOT) BEING IN TWO PLACES AT THE SAME TIME: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ENDURANTISM.
The article discusses the philosophical concern on the assertion that objects can be located in manifold opposite with properties or tropes. It examines endurantism and indexicalism as viewpoints that offer confounding explanations on objects and properties wherein the former affirms that objects re...
| Published in: | American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 46; no. 3; pp. 239 - 249 |
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| Format: | Article |
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University of Illinois Press
Jul2009
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | The article discusses the philosophical concern on the assertion that objects can be located in manifold opposite with properties or tropes. It examines endurantism and indexicalism as viewpoints that offer confounding explanations on objects and properties wherein the former affirms that objects remain through time by being totally placed at different times and the latter declares that entire properties are always indexed. It also analyzes the two different views on the scheme that an object can be totally in two places in the same time, wherein the bundle theory of John O'Leary-Hawthorne connotes that universals can be unified into a bundle to create an object while the theory of John Parson introduces the distributional properties. |
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