| Sumario: | This article focuses on the effects of age, sex, social class, and race on the nature of the responses made in a two-person non-zero-sum game, and presents a study in this regard. In this study, a population of subjects widely different from the usual group have been tested in a two-person game situation with respect to their preferred strategy. The formal properties of specific game matrices which suggest that persons will act to maximize their outcomes are often assumed to operate regardless of the particular nature of the population studied. This assumption is maintained in spite of the fact that the rationale offered for the behavior of persons in these game situations calls upon such social psychological concepts as "cooperation vs. competition," "rationality vs. irrationality," "intelligence," and "trust." The results of the study suggests some interesting and significant differences in their nonpreferred pattern of choices. The major difference between younger and older among the upper-class pairs appears to lie in the risk-taking factor.
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