Age, sex, class, and race differences in response to a two-person non-zero-sum game.

This article focuses on the effects of age, sex, social class, and race on the nature of the responses made in a two-person non-zero-sum game, and presents a study in this regard. In this study, a population of subjects widely different from the usual group have been tested in a two-person game situ...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 9; no. 2; pp. 212 - 221
Autores principales: Sampson, Edward E., Kardush, Marcelle
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Sage Publications Inc. Jun65
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      pub: Sage Publications Inc.
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        atl: Age, sex, class, and race differences in response to a two-person non-zero-sum game.
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          Sampson, Edward E.
          Kardush, Marcelle
        affil: Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley.
      su:
        Conditioned response
        Choice (Psychology)
        Operant behavior
        Risk-taking behavior
        Social classes
        Racial differences
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          Conditioned response
          Choice (Psychology)
          Operant behavior
          Risk-taking behavior
          Social classes
          Racial differences
      keyword: METHODS AND MISCELLANEOUS
      ab: This article focuses on the effects of age, sex, social class, and race on the nature of the responses made in a two-person non-zero-sum game, and presents a study in this regard. In this study, a population of subjects widely different from the usual group have been tested in a two-person game situation with respect to their preferred strategy. The formal properties of specific game matrices which suggest that persons will act to maximize their outcomes are often assumed to operate regardless of the particular nature of the population studied. This assumption is maintained in spite of the fact that the rationale offered for the behavior of persons in these game situations calls upon such social psychological concepts as "cooperation vs. competition," "rationality vs. irrationality," "intelligence," and "trust." The results of the study suggests some interesting and significant differences in their nonpreferred pattern of choices. The major difference between younger and older among the upper-class pairs appears to lie in the risk-taking factor.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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