Sense without Language.
In this paper two claims are made. The first claim is that a Fregean theory of rational thought cannot take senses (or concepts) to be linguistic entities, as has often been the case. The second claim is that, within such a theory, a distinction must be made between Fregean senses, on the one hand,...
| Publicado en: | Teorema Vol. 27; no. 1; pp. 43 - 57 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Teorema
2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=45643447&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 45643447 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02101602 IHG jtl: Teorema issn: 02101602 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2008 vid: 27 iid: 1 pid: 20677 pub: Teorema artinfo: ui: 45643447 ppf: 43 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 115KB tig: atl: Sense without Language. aug: au: Álvarez, Asunción affil: Departamento de Lógica, Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Universidad de Barcelona, C/ Montalegre, 6-8, E-08001 Barcelona su: Reasoning Sense (Philosophy) Thought & thinking Frege, Gottlob, 1848-1925 Logic Reason sug: subj: Reasoning Sense (Philosophy) Thought & thinking Frege, Gottlob, 1848-1925 Logic Reason ab: In this paper two claims are made. The first claim is that a Fregean theory of rational thought cannot take senses (or concepts) to be linguistic entities, as has often been the case. The second claim is that, within such a theory, a distinction must be made between Fregean senses, on the one hand, and what are called intentional aspects, on the other. It is not argued that a Fregean account constitutes the best explanation for rational thought -- as opposed to, for instance, Russellian or functionalist accounts. Its more limited argument is that, if the Fregean route is taken, then the requirements outlined in this paper must be met. En este artículo se defienden dos tesis. La primera tesis es que una teoría fregeana del pensamiento racional no puede considerar los sentidos (o conceptos) como entidades lingüísticas, como ha sido frecuentemente el caso. La segunda tesis es que, dentro de tal teoría, debe establecerse una distinción entre sentidos fregeanos, por un lado, y lo que se denominará aspectos intencionales, por el otro. No se argumenta que una teoría fregeana constituya la mejor explicación del pensamiento racional -- frente a, por ejemplo, teorías russellianas o funcionalistas. Su argumento, más limitado, es que, si se toma la ruta fregeana, entonces los requisitos esbozados en este artículo deben cumplirse. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Teorema is the property of Teorema and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Teorema holder: Teorema dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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