| Sumario: | The Cournot solution to oligopolistic market is based upon the implicit assumptions that each oligopolist has ready access to information about (i) the market demand function, (ii) the market price, and (iii) the level of output of his rival oligopolists. In this note it is shown that a stable Cournot equilibrium could be achieved even when two of the above assumptions are dropped. Neither the market demand function nor the precise production levels of his rivals need be known to each oligopolist. It is necessary only that each oligopolist knows the behaviour of the actual market price. Thus the market is capable of achieving a stable equilibrium if each oligopolist, armed with his own guess (not necessarily accurate) of the market demand function, makes repeated posterior estimates of the amount produced by the "rest of the industry" by examining the actual market price, and if he abides by Cournot's behaviour assumption. Once in such an equilibrium, a constant price will prevail and each oligopolist will continue to realize his expected maximum profit. The market relations are developed in the first section in terms of a system of linear difference equations. The necessary and sufficient condition for a stable solution is discussed in the second section.
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