Moral reasoning about real-life dilemmas: paradox in research using the Defining Issue Test.

Three experiments were conducted to examine whether cognitive-structural models of moral reasoning overlook contextual determinants of moral reasoning and, hence, do not improve knowledge about real-life moral reasoning. In the first experiment, subjects completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT) and...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin Vol. 23; pp. 1022 - 1034
Autor principal: Wygant, Steven A.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Sage Publications Inc. October 1997
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:Three experiments were conducted to examine whether cognitive-structural models of moral reasoning overlook contextual determinants of moral reasoning and, hence, do not improve knowledge about real-life moral reasoning. In the first experiment, subjects completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT) and the Personal Moral Dilemma Inventory (PMDI); in the second, moral role-plays were employed to fill the DIT and PMDI; and in the third, subjects detailed the response sets developing from these role-plays. Findings revealed that high- and low-principled reasoners' replies to real-life problems were not significantly different. In addition, it was more difficult to differentiate from moral to immoral responses to DIT dilemmas than similar reactions to real-life problems. It is concluded that the findings support the assertion that cognitive-structural models of moral reasoning do not deal with everyday moral issues.