Moral reasoning about real-life dilemmas: paradox in research using the Defining Issue Test.
Three experiments were conducted to examine whether cognitive-structural models of moral reasoning overlook contextual determinants of moral reasoning and, hence, do not improve knowledge about real-life moral reasoning. In the first experiment, subjects completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT) and...
| Publicado en: | Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin Vol. 23; pp. 1022 - 1034 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Sage Publications Inc.
October 1997
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=507592421&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 507592421 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01461672 PAS jtl: Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin issn: 01461672 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 1997 vid: 23 pid: 344 pub: Sage Publications Inc. artinfo: ui: 507592421 10.1177/01461672972310003 ppf: 1022 ppct: 12 formats: tig: atl: Moral reasoning about real-life dilemmas: paradox in research using the Defining Issue Test. aug: au: Wygant, Steven A. su: Defining Issues Test Test validity Ethical problems sug: subj: Defining Issues Test Test validity Ethical problems ab: Three experiments were conducted to examine whether cognitive-structural models of moral reasoning overlook contextual determinants of moral reasoning and, hence, do not improve knowledge about real-life moral reasoning. In the first experiment, subjects completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT) and the Personal Moral Dilemma Inventory (PMDI); in the second, moral role-plays were employed to fill the DIT and PMDI; and in the third, subjects detailed the response sets developing from these role-plays. Findings revealed that high- and low-principled reasoners' replies to real-life problems were not significantly different. In addition, it was more difficult to differentiate from moral to immoral responses to DIT dilemmas than similar reactions to real-life problems. It is concluded that the findings support the assertion that cognitive-structural models of moral reasoning do not deal with everyday moral issues. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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