Board games: how CEOs adapt to increases in structural board independence from management.
This paper presents a model that incorporates the behavior of chief executive officers (CEOs) into an explanation of how boards of directors affect organizational outcomes. Hypotheses are tested with archival data on corporate strategy, CEO compensation, board structure, and demographics, together...
| Publicado en: | Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 43; no. 3; pp. 511 - 538 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Administrative Science Quarterly
September 1998
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=507665068&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 507665068 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00018392 ASQ jtl: Administrative Science Quarterly issn: 00018392 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: September 1998 vid: 43 iid: 3 pid: 224 pub: Administrative Science Quarterly artinfo: ui: 507665068 10.2307/2393674 ppf: 511 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 1.5MB tig: atl: Board games: how CEOs adapt to increases in structural board independence from management. aug: au: Westphal, James D. su: Chief executive officers Corporate directors Organizational behavior Corporate governance Business planning sug: subj: Chief executive officers Corporate directors Organizational behavior Corporate governance Business planning ab: This paper presents a model that incorporates the behavior of chief executive officers (CEOs) into an explanation of how boards of directors affect organizational outcomes. Hypotheses are tested with archival data on corporate strategy, CEO compensation, board structure, and demographics, together with data from an original survey of both CEOs and outside directors from 221 large- and medium-sized U.S. corporations. The findings indicate that (1) changes in board structure that increase the board's independence from management are associated with higher levels of CEO ingratiation and persuasion behavior toward board members, and (2) such influence behaviors, in turn, serve to offset the effect of increased structural board independence on corporate strategy and CEO compensation policy. Implications for theory and research on CEO-board power and effectiveness and the larger literature on power and influence are discussed. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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