Consent, Informal Organization and Job Rewards: a Mixed Methods Analysis.
This study uses a mixed methods approach to workplace dynamics. Ethnographic observations show that the consent deal underlies an informal stratification that divides the workplace into an “informal periphery,” a “conventional core” and an “administrative clan.” The “consent deal” is defined as an e...
| Publicado en: | Social Forces (University of North Carolina Press) Vol. 83; no. 4; pp. 1535 - 1566 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / UK
June 2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=507803885&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 507803885 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00377732 SFR jtl: Social Forces (University of North Carolina Press) issn: 00377732 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: June 2005 vid: 83 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / UK artinfo: ui: 507803885 10.1353/sof.2005.0070 ppf: 1535 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 717KB tig: atl: Consent, Informal Organization and Job Rewards: a Mixed Methods Analysis. aug: au: Laubach, Marty su: Sociology of work sug: subj: Sociology of work ab: This study uses a mixed methods approach to workplace dynamics. Ethnographic observations show that the consent deal underlies an informal stratification that divides the workplace into an “informal periphery,” a “conventional core” and an “administrative clan.” The “consent deal” is defined as an exchange of autonomy, voice and schedule flexibility for intensified commitment, and is modeled as a single factor underlying these elements. When constructed as an additive scale, consent allows informal organization to be included in workplace models. Despite its derivation from subjective and informal processes, informal structure exerts an independent effect on objective job rewards such as wages. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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