The expectational stability of underemployment equilibria.
The writer demonstrates the use of a learning algorithm in eliminating the problem of indeterminacy of perfect-foresight models that include external economies of scale. Steady states that are unambiguously socially inferior are ruled out. Although stable low-employment steady states may exist, th...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 33; pp. 319 - 336 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
April 1995
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510128463&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510128463 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: April 1995 vid: 33 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510128463 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01865.x ppf: 319 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: T tig: atl: The expectational stability of underemployment equilibria. aug: au: Moore, Bartholomew J. su: Economic expectations Externalities Stagnation (Economics) Underemployment Mathematical models sug: subj: Economic expectations Externalities Stagnation (Economics) Underemployment Mathematical models ab: The writer demonstrates the use of a learning algorithm in eliminating the problem of indeterminacy of perfect-foresight models that include external economies of scale. Steady states that are unambiguously socially inferior are ruled out. Although stable low-employment steady states may exist, they are not unambiguously inferior due to the presence of both positive and negative externalities. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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