The expectational stability of underemployment equilibria.
The writer demonstrates the use of a learning algorithm in eliminating the problem of indeterminacy of perfect-foresight models that include external economies of scale. Steady states that are unambiguously socially inferior are ruled out. Although stable low-employment steady states may exist, th...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 33; pp. 319 - 336 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
April 1995
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The writer demonstrates the use of a learning algorithm in eliminating the problem of indeterminacy of perfect-foresight models that include external economies of scale. Steady states that are unambiguously socially inferior are ruled out. Although stable low-employment steady states may exist, they are not unambiguously inferior due to the presence of both positive and negative externalities. |
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