What Determines Public Support for Affirmative Action?
We present a public higher-education finance model in which demand for education can exceed supply because of indivisibilities in educational investment. In such situations, a screening mechanism—which may exhibit a selection system bias—is required for allocation. We show how changes in the educati...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 69; no. 3; pp. 612 - 628 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Southern Economic Association
January 2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510290303&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510290303 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: January 2003 vid: 69 iid: 3 pid: 1482 pub: Southern Economic Association artinfo: ui: 510290303 10.2307/1061697 ppf: 612 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: T tig: atl: What Determines Public Support for Affirmative Action? aug: au: Iyigun, Murat F. Levin, Andrew T. su: Public opinion on affirmative action programs Higher education & economics Educational finance Affirmative action programs Mathematical models Education sug: subj: Public opinion on affirmative action programs Higher education & economics Educational finance Affirmative action programs Mathematical models Education ab: We present a public higher-education finance model in which demand for education can exceed supply because of indivisibilities in educational investment. In such situations, a screening mechanism—which may exhibit a selection system bias—is required for allocation. We show how changes in the education premium and the test score gap between the minority and the majority might affect political support for affirmative action. When the education premium is relatively low, the matching efficiency gains provided by affirmative action are high compared with the opportunity cost of not acquiring education, and the majority supports affirmative action. When the education premium is high, the opportunity cost of not getting educated is high relative to the matching efficiency gains provided by affirmative action policies, and the majority's support for affirmative action is weaker. In contrast, a higher test score bias has a generally ambigious effect on the majority's political support. If the test score bias is sufficiently large, however, the majority does support affirmative action. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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